Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक: Basov, Suren (लेखक)
निगमित लेखक: SpringerLink (Online service)
सारांश:IX, 176 p.
text
भाषा:अंग्रेज़ी
प्रकाशित: Singapore : Springer Nature Singapore : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
संस्करण:1st ed. 2016.
श्रृंखला:Studies in Economic Theory, 30
विषय:
Experimental economics.
Experimental Economics.
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5
स्वरूप: इलेक्ट्रोनिक पुस्तक
विषय - सूची:
  • Chapter 1 Preface
  • Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality
  • Chapter 2 Introduction
  • Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design
  • Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design
  • Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality
  • Chapter 6 Conclusions
  • Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design
  • Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship
  • Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems
  • Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment
  • Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.

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