Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /
| Hoofdauteurs: | , |
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| Coauteur: | |
| Samenvatting: | X, 92 p. text |
| Taal: | Engels |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer,
2019.
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| Editie: | 1st ed. 2019. |
| Reeks: | SpringerBriefs in Economics,
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8 |
| Formaat: | Elektronisch Boek |
Inhoudsopgave:
- Introduction
- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
- Summary.