Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Συγγραφέας), Nurmi, Hannu (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Περίληψη:X, 92 p.
text
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έκδοση: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
Έκδοση:1st ed. 2019.
Σειρά:SpringerBriefs in Economics,
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Βιβλίο
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • Introduction
  • 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
  • Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
  • Summary.