Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلفون الرئيسيون:	Felsenthal, Dan S. (مؤلف), Nurmi, Hannu (مؤلف)
مؤلف مشترك:	SpringerLink (Online service)
الملخص:	X, 92 p. text
اللغة:	الإنجليزية
منشور في:	Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
الطبعة:	1st ed. 2019.
سلاسل:	SpringerBriefs in Economics,
الموضوعات:	Social choice. Welfare economics. Elections. Political science > Philosophy. Econometrics. Political science. Social Choice and Welfare. Electoral Politics. Political Philosophy. Quantitative Economics. Political Science.
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
التنسيق:	الكتروني كتاب

جدول المحتويات:

Introduction
20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
Summary.

مواد مشابهة