Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
|---|---|
| مؤلف مشترك: | |
| الملخص: | IX, 176 p. text |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Singapore :
Springer Nature Singapore : Imprint: Springer,
2016.
|
| الطبعة: | 1st ed. 2016. |
| سلاسل: | Studies in Economic Theory,
30 |
| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5 |
| التنسيق: | الكتروني كتاب الكتروني |
جدول المحتويات:
- Chapter 1 Preface
- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality
- Chapter 2 Introduction
- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design
- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design
- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality
- Chapter 6 Conclusions
- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design
- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship
- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems
- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment
- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.