Extending the Extended Mind From Cognition to Consciousness /
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلف مشترك: | |
| الملخص: | XVI, 217 p. text |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Cham :
Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,
2023.
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| الطبعة: | 1st ed. 2023. |
| سلاسل: | New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science,
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35624-7 |
| التنسيق: | الكتروني كتاب |
جدول المحتويات:
- 1 A Roadmap from the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind
- 1.1 Where Does the Mind Stop?
- 1.2 Concepts of Cognition and Consciousness
- 1.3 4E’s: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended
- 1.3.1 Embodied
- 1.3.2 Embedded
- 1.3.3 Enacted
- 1.3.4 Extended
- 1.4 From the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind
- 1.4.1 The Extended Mind
- 1.4.2 The Waves to the Extended Conscious Mind
- 1.4.3 Vehicular Externalism
- 1.5 Conclusions and Methodological Remarks
- References
- 2 Arguments for Extended Conscious Mind
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 First Argument for ECM: Parity Argument
- 2.2.1 Cognition and Consciousness Are Often Inseparable
- 2.2.2 Occurrent EM
- 2.2.3 Wheeler’s Objection
- 2.2.4 Summing Up the First Argument
- 2.3 Second Argument for ECM: Sensorimotor Enactivism
- 2.3.1 Landscapes of Sensorimotor Enactivism
- 2.3.2 Bridging the Comparative Explanatory Gap
- 2.3.3 Sensorimotor Reductionism or Sensorimotor Integrationism?
- 2.3.4 Temporal Nature, Virtual Presence
- 2.3.5 Arguments Drawn from Sensorimotor Enactivism in Support of ECM
- 2.3.6 Does Entailment Hold? From the Personal to the Sub-Personal Level
- 2.3.7 Summing Up the Second Argument
- 2.4 Third Argument for ECM: The Leaky Body
- 2.4.1 Experience Is Embodied
- 2.4.2 The Frontiers of the Body Are Not Rigid
- 2.4.3 External Body Parts as Substrates of Experience
- 2.5 Conclusions to the Three Arguments
- References
- 3 The Constitution-Turn and Extended Conscious Mind
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.1.1 The Causal–Constitution Fallacy
- 3.1.2 The Constituted Phenomenon: The Dynamic Nature of Experiences
- 3.2 Defining Constitution
- 3.2.1 Material Constitution
- 3.2.2 Mechanist Constitution
- 3.2.3 Diachronic–Dynamical Constitution
- 3.3 Demarcating the System Boundaries
- 3.3.1 Mutual Manipulability as a Demarcation Criterion
- 3.4 Conclusions
- References
- 4 Tools as Extenders: The Pathway to Functional Incorporation
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 The Spectrum of Extensions
- 4.2.1 Momentary Extension.-4.2.2 Integrated Extension
- 4.2.3 Prosthetic Incorporation
- 4.2.4 Functional Incorporation
- 4.2.5 Summing Up the Four Degrees of Extension
- 4.3 “Glue & Trust” Conditions
- 4.3.1 Glue & Trust Conditions for EM
- 4.3.2 Criteria Compared with ECM
- 4.3.3 Glue & Trust Conditions for ECM
- 4.4 An Example of Functional Incorporation: Sensory Substitution
- 4.5 Conclusions
- References
- 5 Possible Objections to Extended Conscious Mind
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.1.1 Clark’s Criticisms of ECM
- 5.2 The Argument from High Bandwidth
- 5.2.1 Answers to the High-Bandwidth Argument
- 5.3 Predictive Processing
- 5.3.1 Answering the Counter-argument from Predictive Processing
- 5.4 The Brain-in-a-Vat Thought Experiment
- 5.5 Dreams and Hallucinations
- 5.5.1 Revonsuo’s Dream Argument
- 5.5.2 Answering the Dream Challenge
- 5.6 Summarising the Counter-arguments
- References
- 6 Concluding Remarks and the Future of Extension
- References.