Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

Podrobná bibliografie
Hlavní autoři: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Autor), Nurmi, Hannu (Autor)
Korporativní autor: SpringerLink (Online service)
Shrnutí:X, 92 p.
text
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
Vydání:1st ed. 2019.
Edice:SpringerBriefs in Economics,
Témata:
On-line přístup:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
Médium: Elektronický zdroj Kniha
Obsah:
  • Introduction
  • 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
  • Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
  • The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
  • Summary.