Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes /

Chi tiết về thư mục
Những tác giả chính:	Felsenthal, Dan S. (Tác giả), Nurmi, Hannu (Tác giả)
Tác giả của công ty:	SpringerLink (Online service)
Tóm tắt:	X, 92 p. text
Ngôn ngữ:	Tiếng Anh
Được phát hành:	Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
Phiên bản:	1st ed. 2019.
Loạt:	SpringerBriefs in Economics,
Những chủ đề:	Social choice. Welfare economics. Elections. Political science > Philosophy. Econometrics. Political science. Social Choice and Welfare. Electoral Politics. Political Philosophy. Quantitative Economics. Political Science.
Truy cập trực tuyến:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
Định dạng:	Điện tử Sách

Mục lục:

Introduction
20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain
Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
Summary.

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