书本目录:
  • Part I: Knowledge
  • Chapter 1. Reflective Knowledge (Ernest Sosa)
  • Chapter 2. Epistemically Useful Falsehoods (Catherine Z. Elgin)
  • Chapter 3. Theoretical Unity in Epistemology (Jonathan L. Kvanvig)
  • Chapter 4. Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief (Richard Foley)
  • Chapter 5. Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary (Rodrigo Borges)
  • Chapter 6. A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing (Robert K. Shope)
  • Part II: Scepticism
  • Chapter 7. The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism (Linda Zagzebski)
  • Chapter 8. Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism (Sharon Ryan)
  • Chapter 9. Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination (Claudio de Almeida)
  • Part III: Justification
  • Chapter 10. Finite Minds (Michael Huemer)
  • Chapter 11. Finite Minds and Open Minds (Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson)
  • Chapter 12. Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification (Sanford C. Goldberg)
  • Chapter 13. A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat (Matthew Kotzen)
  • Chapter 14: Benign Infinity (Matthias Steup).