The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
| Príomhchruthaitheoir: | |
|---|---|
| Údar corparáideach: | |
| Achoimre: | XVI, 288 p. text |
| Teanga: | Béarla |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
London :
Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,
2016.
|
| Eagrán: | 1st ed. 2016. |
| Sraith: | Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy,
|
| Ábhair: | |
| Rochtain ar líne: | https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3 |
| Formáid: | Leictreonach LEABHAR |
Clár na nÁbhar:
- Acknowledgments
- Credits
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States
- 1. Sensations and perceptions
- The objectivity of perceptual representation
- Perceptual contents
- Sensory states and sensations
- 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments
- Propositional attitudes as dispositions
- Propositional attitudes as commitments
- 3. Emotions
- Emotions as sensations
- Emotions as evaluative judgments
- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes
- Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties
- The borderline view of emotions
- 4. Summary
- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge
- 1. First personal self-knowledge
- Groundlessness
- Transparency
- Authority
- 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science?
- 3. Third-personal self-knowledge
- 4. Summary
- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts
- 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan
- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam
- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon
- 4. Summary
- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts
- 1. Peacocke’s rational internalism
- 2. Burge’s rational externalism
- 3. Evans’ transparency method
- 3.1 Fernández’ epistemic account
- 3.2 Moran’s deliberative account
- 4. Summary
- Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge
- 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein
- 2. Bar-On’s neo-expressivism
- 3. Summary
- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories
- 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker
- 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright
- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami
- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva
- The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency
- Objections from empirical psychology
- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority
- 5. Summary
- Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge
- 1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts
- 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism
- Sensations
- Basic emotions
- Perceptions and perceptual experiences
- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge
- 4. Summary
- Appendix: Moore’s Paradox
- 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses
- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore’s paradox
- 3. What Moore’s paradox isn’t about: Jane’s off case
- 4. What Moore’s paradox is about—first pass
- 5. What Moore’s paradox is about—second pass
- 6. An objection
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name index
- Subject index.