The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Coliva, Annalisa (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (Online service)
Resumo:XVI, 288 p.
text
Idioma:inglês
Publicado em: London : Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Edição:1st ed. 2016.
coleção:Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy,
Assuntos:
Knowledge, Theory of.
Philosophy of mind.
Emotions.
Epistemology.
Philosophy of Mind.
Emotion.
Acesso em linha:https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3
Formato: Recurso Eletrônico livro eletrônico
Sumário:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Credits
  • List of abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States
  • 1. Sensations and perceptions
  • The objectivity of perceptual representation
  • Perceptual contents
  • Sensory states and sensations
  • 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments
  • Propositional attitudes as dispositions
  • Propositional attitudes as commitments
  • 3. Emotions
  • Emotions as sensations
  • Emotions as evaluative judgments
  • Emotions as felt bodily attitudes
  • Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties
  • The borderline view of emotions
  • 4. Summary
  • Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • 1. First personal self-knowledge
  • Groundlessness
  • Transparency
  • Authority
  • 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science?
  • 3. Third-personal self-knowledge
  • 4. Summary
  • Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts
  • 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan
  • 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam
  • 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon
  • 4. Summary
  • Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts
  • 1. Peacocke’s rational internalism
  • 2. Burge’s rational externalism
  • 3. Evans’ transparency method
  • 3.1 Fernández’ epistemic account
  • 3.2 Moran’s deliberative account
  • 4. Summary
  • Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge
  • 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein
  • 2. Bar-On’s neo-expressivism
  • 3. Summary
  • Chapter six: Constitutive Theories
  • 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker
  • 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright
  • 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami
  • 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva
  • The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency
  • Objections from empirical psychology
  • The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority
  • 5. Summary
  • Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge
  • 1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts
  • 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism
  • Sensations
  • Basic emotions
  • Perceptions and perceptual experiences
  • 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge
  • 4. Summary
  • Appendix: Moore’s Paradox
  • 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses
  • 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore’s paradox
  • 3. What Moore’s paradox isn’t about: Jane’s off case
  • 4. What Moore’s paradox is about—first pass
  • 5. What Moore’s paradox is about—second pass
  • 6. An objection
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Name index
  • Subject index.

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