Simulated-based vulnerability assessment for placement of detection systems within gamma irradiation facility; Научная инициатива иностранных студентов и аспирантов
| Parent link: | Научная инициатива иностранных студентов и аспирантов.— 2026.— С. 568-572 |
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| Shrnutí: | Physical Protection Systems (PPS), for use in gamma irradiation facilities require optimal sensor placement to provide the highest probability of interruption (P I ) as well as cost effective design. This research will present a simulation-based vulnerability assessment using the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) Model to determine the four possible detection system designs for one adversary path that targets Category I radioactive sources (Cobalt-60). A Monte Carlo Simulation (10,000 iterations) was used to measure the uncertainty of the results. The results show that Configuration D (Optimized) achieves P I = 0.880 ± 0.002 using 3 sensors while Configuration B (Distributed) achieved P I = 0.882 ± 0.000 using 6 sensors. The optimized configuration will provide 99.8 % of the best possible protection for a system with approximately 50 % less complexity. Configuration A (Perimeter-Only) failed to meet security criteria (P I = 0.750 < 0.80). Statistical analysis confirmed significant differences between configurations (p < 0.001). This methodology provides a quantitative framework for PPS design optimization Текстовый файл |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
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2026
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| On-line přístup: | http://earchive.tpu.ru/handle/11683/139476 |
| Médium: | Elektronický zdroj Kapitola |
| KOHA link: | https://koha.lib.tpu.ru/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=688628 |
| Shrnutí: | Physical Protection Systems (PPS), for use in gamma irradiation facilities require optimal sensor placement to provide the highest probability of interruption (P I ) as well as cost effective design. This research will present a simulation-based vulnerability assessment using the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) Model to determine the four possible detection system designs for one adversary path that targets Category I radioactive sources (Cobalt-60). A Monte Carlo Simulation (10,000 iterations) was used to measure the uncertainty of the results. The results show that Configuration D (Optimized) achieves P I = 0.880 ± 0.002 using 3 sensors while Configuration B (Distributed) achieved P I = 0.882 ± 0.000 using 6 sensors. The optimized configuration will provide 99.8 % of the best possible protection for a system with approximately 50 % less complexity. Configuration A (Perimeter-Only) failed to meet security criteria (P I = 0.750 < 0.80). Statistical analysis confirmed significant differences between configurations (p < 0.001). This methodology provides a quantitative framework for PPS design optimization Текстовый файл |
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