Epistemological Field and Constellation of Fact in Wittgenstein’s and Popper’s Philosophy

Epistemological Field and Constellation of Fact in Wittgenstein’s and Popper’s Philosophy

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Parent link:Axiomathes
Vol. 30, iss. 3.— 2020.— [P. 327-346]
Hlavní autor: Goncharenko M. V. Mark Vasilievich
Korporativní autor: Национальный исследовательский Томский политехнический университет (ТПУ) Школа базовой инженерной подготовки (ШБИП) Отделение социально-гуманитарных наук (ОСГН)
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In this article, a comparative analysis of Karl Popper’s falsifiability theory and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the context of the historical-philosophical approach to the problem of new knowledge formation and justification is undertaken. An assumption is made that the constellation of fact is connected with the possibility of the emergence of an epistemological field. Researchers have repeatedly addressed this issue; however, one important detail received no due attention: Popper’s counter-arguments regarding Wittgenstein’s view on semantic paradoxes show the fundamental difference of these philosophers’ views on the sign and the signified (language and world), which contributes to the analysis of new knowledge formation. Arguments that concern both early and late periods of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are used in this study. The uncertainty of the demarcation criterion (according to Popper) allowed analyzing Wittgenstein’s position as to how and why different rules of inference form different epistemological fields.
Режим доступа: по договору с организацией-держателем ресурса
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: 2020
Témata:
электронный ресурс
труды учёных ТПУ
fact
epistemological field
wittgenstein
popper
theory of meaning
falsifiability theory
факты
эпистемология
On-line přístup:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09458-7
Médium: Elektronický zdroj Kapitola
KOHA link:https://koha.lib.tpu.ru/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=662128

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