Game theoretic frequency reuse approach in OFDMA femtocell networks
| Parent link: | Emerging Telecommunications Technologies (ETT) Vol. 29, iss. 10.— 2018.— [e3440, 15 p.] |
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| Shrnutí: | Title screen In this paper, we initially dealt with the issue of spectrum allocation among macro (or “licensed”) and femto (or “unlicensed”) users in an orthogonal frequency division multiple access femtocell network of noncooperative game theoretic frequency reuse approach. We formulate the difficulty based on spectrum bidding. Here, individual secondary users (SUs) create an auction for the amount of bandwidth and every primary user can share the frequency band among SUs by itself according to the intelligence from SUs without lowering its own performance. Here, we consider that the bidding is a noncooperative game and one of its solutions is a Nash equilibrium. The femto base stations are grouped into different cluster for mitigating the undesired interference among them. The game theoretical method deals with the intercluster frequency clashes. We exemplified a link between utility function and the number of players by noncooperative game theoretic approach to guide the spectrum sharing decision at the cell edges. The convergence of the development mechanism is rigorously scrutinized and extensive numerical outcomes are presented to illustrate their potential merits. |
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2018
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| On-line přístup: | https://doi.org/10.1002/ett.3440 |
| Médium: | Elektronický zdroj Kapitola |
| KOHA link: | https://koha.lib.tpu.ru/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=661418 |
| Shrnutí: | Title screen In this paper, we initially dealt with the issue of spectrum allocation among macro (or “licensed”) and femto (or “unlicensed”) users in an orthogonal frequency division multiple access femtocell network of noncooperative game theoretic frequency reuse approach. We formulate the difficulty based on spectrum bidding. Here, individual secondary users (SUs) create an auction for the amount of bandwidth and every primary user can share the frequency band among SUs by itself according to the intelligence from SUs without lowering its own performance. Here, we consider that the bidding is a noncooperative game and one of its solutions is a Nash equilibrium. The femto base stations are grouped into different cluster for mitigating the undesired interference among them. The game theoretical method deals with the intercluster frequency clashes. We exemplified a link between utility function and the number of players by noncooperative game theoretic approach to guide the spectrum sharing decision at the cell edges. The convergence of the development mechanism is rigorously scrutinized and extensive numerical outcomes are presented to illustrate their potential merits. |
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| DOI: | 10.1002/ett.3440 |