Moral Hazard as a Marriage of Convenience: Do Universities Benefit from Getting Rid of Week Students?; Social Science Research Network (SSRN); June 14

Detaylı Bibliyografya
Parent link:Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
June 14.— 2010.— [5 p.]
Yazar: Malanina V. A. Veronika Anatolievna
Özet:Title screen
The contradiction between individual and socially preferable university strategies towards underachieving students is analysed using the concept of Nash equilibrium
Dil:İngilizce
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: 2010
Konular:
Online Erişim:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2146419
Materyal Türü: Elektronik Kitap Bölümü
KOHA link:https://koha.lib.tpu.ru/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=642344

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