Moral Hazard as a Marriage of Convenience: Do Universities Benefit from Getting Rid of Week Students?

Bibliografische gegevens
Parent link:Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
June 14.— 2010.— [5 p.]
Hoofdauteur: Malanina V. A. Veronika Anatolievna
Samenvatting:Title screen
The contradiction between individual and socially preferable university strategies towards underachieving students is analysed using the concept of Nash equilibrium
Taal:Engels
Gepubliceerd in: 2010
Onderwerpen:
Online toegang:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2146419
Formaat: Elektronisch Hoofdstuk
KOHA link:https://koha.lib.tpu.ru/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=642344
Omschrijving
Samenvatting:Title screen
The contradiction between individual and socially preferable university strategies towards underachieving students is analysed using the concept of Nash equilibrium
DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2146419